This chapter posits that cryptocurrencies are not merely technical or financial instruments but are nascent cultural systems. Their future viability and mainstream adoption depend less on achieving perfect algorithmic certainty and more on their capacity to foster "embodied trust"—a form of social cohesion rooted in shared values, legible recourse mechanisms, and high-commitment communities. The central argument is that protocol architecture is a form of cultural architecture, actively shaping the societies that build upon it.
This chapter challenges two central dogmas shared by most mainstream cryptocurrencies—fundamental assumptions that have become so deeply embedded in the design philosophy of these systems that they are rarely questioned or critically examined. These two assumptions, while appearing technically neutral, carry profound cultural implications that shape how users interact with these systems and how society perceives them. This blind spot—the failure to recognize that these are ideological choices rather than inevitable technical necessities—prevents wider societal acceptance and limits the potential for cryptocurrencies to serve as the foundation for truly functional digital-physical societies.
The first dogma is the ideology of "trustlessness"—this chapter reveals it as a transference rather than an elimination of trust, and explores new models of human intermediation that acknowledge this reality.
The second dogma is transaction irreversibility. This chapter reframes it as a problem of power distribution, examining emerging systems of decentralized justice that can distinguish legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Finally, it contrasts the low-commitment crypto subcultures that these dogmas have fostered with new protocol designs aimed at rewarding pro-social, high-commitment behaviors, proposing a framework for building durable digital societies.
Blockchain protocols are not neutral substrates upon which culture is built; they are active shapers of behavior. The architectural decisions made at the protocol level function as cultural imprinting mechanisms, implicitly selecting for and rewarding specific values. These values, in turn, give rise to distinct forms of cultural capital, defining the social hierarchies and power dynamics within their respective ecosystems. This section analyzes how two fundamental design choices—the consensus mechanism and the transaction model—serve as the primary architects of these nascent digital cultures.
Participation in any given crypto-ecosystem requires a form of cultural initiation. Prospective members must master a specialized lexicon, with terms like "WAGMI" (We're All Gonna Make It), "HODL" (Hold On for Dear Life), and "rekt" (wrecked) serving as shibboleths that distinguish insiders from outsiders.4 They must also adhere to specific communication norms on platforms like Discord and Telegram, which serve as the primary venues for community coordination and narrative-building.6 This combination of specialized language, technical proficiency, and adherence to social norms constitutes a form of cultural capital, creating social hierarchies and defining the boundaries of the in-group.5
The origins of this phenomenon can be traced to the earliest days of the ecosystem, which took shape in "obscure forums where libertarian idealists and coding cowboys" developed a shared identity around the core values of decentralization, permission-less innovation, and radical transparency.5 This foundation reveals that cryptocurrency has been a social and ideological project from its inception, not merely a technical one. The subsequent evolution from this niche counterculture to a sprawling digital landscape where "suit-wearing fund managers" now interact with "hoodie-wearing day traders" illustrates the ongoing negotiation and diversification of this cultural capital.5 Despite this expansion, a core belief in the power of decentralized systems remains a powerful, unifying cultural tenet.
A core tenet of the cryptocurrency movement is the creation of "trustless" systems that eliminate the need for traditional intermediaries.14 This section critically deconstructs this concept, arguing that trust is not eliminated but merely transferred to different set of actors. It explores the inherent human desire for intermediation, especially in times of crisis, and examines how new designs are attempting to re-integrate social trust without re-creating centralized vulnerabilities.
The promise of blockchain technology is an ecosystem where transactions can occur securely in a "trustless environment," without relying on intermediaries like banks or governments.8 However, a closer examination reveals this narrative to be misleading. Trust is not eliminated; it is transferred. It moves from regulated, legally accountable institutions to a new set of often pseudonymous and unaccountable entities: the protocol developers who write the code, the core contributors with commit access to repositories, the developers of third-party wallets, and the operators of centralized exchanges.14
As sociologist Niklas Luhmann argued, trust is a mechanism for reducing social complexity, allowing societies to function despite uncertainty.14 Blockchain's version of "trustlessness" attempts to replace interpersonal trust with technological trust, making systems transparent and tamper-proof, with the motto: “don’t trust, verify”. Yet, this shift does not remove the need for trust. Instead, it places an immense burden of trust on the technology itself and, crucially, on the individual's own capacity for flawless operational security.14 The user must trust that the smart contract code is free of vulnerabilities, that their wallet software is secure, and that they will not make a single, irreversible error. Even within a "trustless" system, users are forced to place immense, often blind, trust in code, its creators, and the centralized services required to access the decentralized network.
This ideology of "trustlessness" does not eliminate risk but rather reconfigures it. It shifts systemic, institutional risk (such as a bank failure, which is often mitigated by deposit insurance) into idiosyncratic, individual risk (such as losing a private key, which results in catastrophic and uninsured loss). Traditional finance socializes and manages risk through trusted intermediaries and legal recourse. In contrast, the crypto ethos of "self-custody" privatizes it entirely. The full burden of security, fraud prevention, and key management falls upon the individual. To be truly trustless, one must be able to "independently verify each transaction on your own node".16 This transference has profound cultural implications, creating a system that is unforgiving to human error and that favors the technically proficient. It is a system that is both empowering for experts and deeply alienating and dangerous for novices.
The narrative of pure disintermediation is further challenged by the practical realities of how blockchain networks operate. Inherent frictions in these systems, such as latency in transaction processing and the need for privacy, have led to the emergence of a new class of specialized intermediaries, contradicting the vision of a perfectly flat, peer-to-peer system.17
The "DeFi Intermediation Chain" on Ethereum provides a compelling example of this re-intermediation.17 Arbitrageurs seeking to profit from market inefficiencies do not broadcast their transactions to the public network, where they could be front-run. Instead, they send their transactions to trusted "block builders," who aggregate them privately. These builders then compete to have their block selected by powerful "block proposers"—validators who are often large, centralized staking pools run by major exchanges.17 This multi-layered chain connects the end user to the blockchain via a series of specialized, trusted actors.
This re-intermediation is not a failure of decentralized technology but a natural market response to fundamental needs for efficiency and privacy that the base protocol cannot provide. It demonstrates a persistent tendency toward the concentration of market power and the re-emergence of trusted relationships, even within a system explicitly designed to obviate them.17 The result is a system where decentralization at the protocol layer coexists with significant centralization at the operational layer.